In addition, incentives for sensible fishing practices create bet

In addition, incentives for sensible fishing practices create better communication within the industry [personal communication]. Port communities are affected by changes in selleck compound fisheries management, including catch shares implementation. Ports used in the Alaska halibut and sablefish fisheries saw changes as catch shares removed the

time pressure to land at the nearest port. As fishermen’s flexibility to choose ports increased, most ports of small value had decreased halibut and sablefish landings, while middle-tier ports, and one small-value port, benefited through increased and more evenly distributed landings (Fig. 9) [57]. Halibut landings end in 37% of total ports; however, these ports only account for 8% of total value [3] and [57]. Thus, while the economic effects on individuals and individual communities are sometimes considerable, port consolidation was limited in the Alaska sablefish and halibut fisheries. Most ports experienced a change of less than $500,000 in landings per year [57]. In addition, many fishermen choose to retire once tradable quota shares give them the means to do so, resulting in some communities losing sources of fishing heritage [personal communication]. Most middle-tier ports, in

contrast, benefited from catch shares. As the fishery became more profitable and total revenues increased, these ports benefited from increased economic activity [57]. Fish processors are also affected by the transition from traditional management to catch share management when catch shares alters a fishery’s landing pattern. Under race for fish conditions selleck chemical that result in short annual seasons, the processing industry (along with fisheries) can become overcapitalized to handle the glut of fish in short periods. When short-season fisheries transition to catch shares, the season stabilizes, landings smooth, the efficient

amount of peak processing capacity reduces. For example, in the British Columbia halibut fishery, over 45% of the catch was typically landed in a large glut in April with a secondary spike of 33% in September. Under catch shares, April landings are merely 14% of the annual ID-8 catch, and the highest month is May with 17% of the annual landings (Fig. 10) [111], [112], [113] and [114]. In some cases, excess processor capacity shifts pricing power to fishermen as processors compete to maintain high levels of fish supply [115] and [116]. In the Alaska halibut and sablefish fisheries, processors are estimated to have lost 56% and 76% of their pre-catch shares wealth, respectively [115]. In British Columbia, these shifts also allowed new processors to enter the field and gain economic benefits from catch shares. As fishery landings spread out throughout the year and fish no longer needed to be frozen, costs of entry declined and new processors entered [personal communication].

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